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FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(f):




Effective December 1, 1998, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the class action rule, was amended to allow
discretionary interlocutory appeals of class certification
decisions.' The amendment, subdivision (f) of the rule, is
striking for its economy of language:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying class
action certification under this rule if application is made to
it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the court of appeals so orders.2
Creation of a federal court appeal procedure by rule, rather
than statute, is unique. The authority to address interlocutory
appeals of class actions by rule flows from 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
That section creates a number of narrowly drawn interlocutory
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. Although the process that leads to adoption of a federal rule of civil procedure is
quite elaborate, the essential steps involve publication of the proposed rule change for
public comment and successive considerations and recommendations by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Supreme Court. Following the
Supreme Court's formal adoption of the rule, the rule is transmitted to Congress and
becomes effective generally on December I in the year in which it is proposed by the
Court, unless Congress by statute modifies or rejects the rule prior to that date. The federal
rule process is outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 and in the procedures of the Judicial
Conference.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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appeal exceptions to the final judgment rule, including in
subsection (b) a general exception for discretionary interlocutory
appeals.' In addition to prescribing those exceptions, subsection
(e) of section 1292 gives the Supreme Court authority to
"prescribe rules, in accordance with [the Rules Enabling Act] to
provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts
of appeals that is not otherwise provided for."' The interlocutory
appeal procedure of rule 23(f) was promulgated by the authority
granted the Supreme Court by that subsection. Rule 23(f) is the
only federal rule of civil procedure created through the
section 1292(e) process.
The purposes of thenew rule are severalfold: to provide a
mechanism for needed appellate review of class certification
orders that as a practical matter are unlikely to receive review; to
afford a more regular means of appellate involvement in the
class certification process; and to enable the courts of appeals to
develop certification standards.' Although the amendment may
3. For a discussion of the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as an interlocutory appeal
procedure, see infra Part I1.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). The genesis of section 1292(e) was explained by the United
States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in Blair v. Equifax Check Services, hic.:
In 1992, at the suggestion of the Federal Courts Study Committee, Congress
authorized the Supreme Court to issue rules that expand the set of allowable
interlocutory appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). An earlier grant of jurisdictional
rulemaking power-28 U.S.C. § 2072(c), which permits the Court to "define
when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section
1291"-had gone unused, in part because it invites the question whether a
particular rule truly "defines" or instead expands appellate jurisdiction. Section
1292(e) expressly authorizes expansions.
181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999).
5. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) committee note; Judicial Conference of the
United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of February 16-17, 1995, 1995
WL 870909; Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
Minutes of November 9-10, 1995, 1995 WL 870908; Judicial Conference of the United
States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of April 18-19, 1996, 1996 WL
936787; Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
Minutes of March 20-21, 1997, 1997 WL 1056240; Judicial Conference of the United
States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of May 1-2, 1997, 1997 WL 1056241;
Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of
September 4-6, 1997, 1997 WL 1056731; Judicial Conference of the United States,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of October 6-7, 1997, 1997 WL 1056239;
Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Minutes of June 19-20, 1997, 1997 WL 1056244 and 1997 WL 936792; Judicial
Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, Minutes of April
15, 1996, 1996 WL 936781; and Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, Minutes of Telephone Conference of May 1, 1996, 1996
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not appear of great consequence to those unfamiliar with class
action litigation in the federal courts, the Chair of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure declared that rule
23(f) "alone... might well prove to be the most effective
solution to many of the problems with class actions." 6 If so, rule
23(f) will operate as an agent of change indirectly and gradually
as the courts of appeals further develop the law applicable to
certification of class action decisions.
This article will review the new rule and related issues,
considering: (1) the importance of the class certification decision
and appellate review of that decision; (2) the historical
limitations on appellate review of certification decisions; (3) the
rationale for allowing appeal of interlocutory certification
decisions but not other interlocutory decisions; (4) the operation
of rule 23(f); (5) the first application of the rule in the Seventh
Circuit's decision of Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc.; and
(6) the prospects for rule 23(f) achieving its goals.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CERTIFICATION DECISION
AND APPELLATE REVIEW
Rule 23(c)(1) directs that the district court make an early
decision whether a case should proceed as a class action. In the
language of the rule, the decision is to be made "as soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action." 7 On a litigation timeline, the certification decision
will normally be made after the pleadings are closed but before
extensive discovery going to the merits of the case has begun.8
WL 936782. See also the Seventh Circuit's explanation of "the reasons Rule 23(f) came
into being" in Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (1999), the first
court of appeals decision under the rule.
6. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes of June 19-20, 1997, Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
1997 WL 1056244, at * 13.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
8. Parkinson v. April Indus., 520 F.2d 650, 655 (2d Cir. .1975). Many federal district
courts have promulgated local rules requiring that a rule 23(c)(1) motion be made within a
specific time, for instance, 90 days after the filing of the complaint. See, e.g., E.D. & W.D.
ARK. R. 23.1. However, a trend is developing toward greater flexibility in the timing of the
certification decision. For instance, pre-certification rulings on motions to dismiss and
summary judgment are now common practice. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The
Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 615
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The decision is often crucial. If the class is certified, defendants
frequently pursue settlement rather than incur extensive
discovery and trial expenses and risk the prospect of an
overwhelming judgment in favor of the class. 9  When
certification is denied, the representative plaintiffs often dismiss
the action, concluding that continuance of the litigation on an
individual basis is not economically worthwhile.' °
Because the certification decision can have a life or death
impact on the course of class action litigation, appellate review
of that decision is often of major importance to the
litigants."Appellate review of certification decisions is also
critical to the development of class certification standards
established through the decisions of the courts of appeals. 2 Prior
to adoption of rule 23(f), the opportunity for appellate review of
certification decisions was limited or effectively nonexistent in
most class actions. Appellate review turned in large measure on
app. A at G (1997)(Advisory Committee Note to proposed amendment of rule 23(c)(1)).
The proposed amendment has not been adopted. See Judicial Conference of the United
States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of October 6-7, 1997, 1997 WL
1056239, at *2; Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Minutes of June'19-20, 1997, 1997 WL 1056244, at *14.
Despite the "as soon as practicable" language of rule 23(c)(1), there'is no hard and
fast rule regarding the timing of the certification decision. The timing of the certification
decision runs from several months to several years after the filing of the complaint. 2
HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7.14 (3d ed. 1992). A proposal to
change the "as soon as practicable" standard of rule 23(c)(1) to "when practicable" was
defeated at the June 1997 meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The proposed change was to give district courts "needed flexibility to deal with the various
categories and conditions of class ction." Judicial Conference of the United States,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of June 19-20, 1997, 1997 WL
1056244, at * 14.
9. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
Minutes of February 16-17, 1995, 1995 WL 870909, at *9.
t0. Id.
11. See, e.g., 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3914.19, at 55-56 (2d ed. 1992); Jordon L. Kruse, Comment, Appealability
of Class Certification Orders: The "Mandamus Appeal' and a Proposal to Amend Rule
23, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 704, 704 (1997); Judicial Conference of the United States,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of June 19-20, 1997, 1996 WL
936792, at *21 (comments of Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham).
12. See, e.g., Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in
Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1790
(1997); Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes of June 19-20, 1997, Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
1997 WL 1056244, at *13.
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(o
whether the certification order could be considered a final
decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the federal court
version of the final judgment rule.13 Under the final judgment
rule, appeals can normally be taken only from final decisions of
the district courts, that is, decisions that "end the litigation on
the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment." 14 Because many class actions are resolved through
settlement or voluntary dismissal precipitated by the
certification decision, relatively few lead to final decisions
satisfying the requirements of the final judgment rule.'5 As a
practical matter, prior to adoption of rule 23(f), the final
judgment rule imposed a nearly insurmountable barrier to
effective review of many class certification decisions.
13. Section 1291 gives the circuit courts jurisdiction of appeals "from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States." As a matter of federal law, the final
judgment rule dates from the Judiciary Act of 1789 and to this day admits of few
exceptions. See discussion of exceptions to final judgment rule infra Part Ill.
14. See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945). As explained by the United
States Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974), the
policy underlying the final judgment rule "prevents the debilitating effect on judicial
administration caused by piecemeal appeal disposition of what is, in practical consequence,
but a single controversy." In Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940), Mr.
Justice Frankfurter offered a more elaborate explanation of the policy underlying the final
judgment rule:
Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate
procedure. It was written into the first Judiciary Act and has been departed from
only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at
all. Because the right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of
grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice, Congress from the very
beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for
practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial
administration. Thereby is avoided the obstruction to just claims that would
come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate
appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its
initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective, judicial administration must not
be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate
reviews of the component elements in a unified cause.
Id. at 324-25 (footnotes omitted).
15. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note Ii, at 69-71, 77-80.
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III. THE HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON APPELLATE REVIEW
OF CERTIFICATION DECISIONS
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, several circuit courts of appeals had held
certain trial court orders denying class action certification to be
appealable final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291." In those
circuits the denial of certification was appealable because the
decision was regarded as sounding the "death knell" of the case.
That is, the court viewed the decision as effectively bringing an
end to the litigation for final judgment rule purposes.
The "death knell doctrine" required that the district court
first consider the dollar amount of the representative plaintiffs'
individual claims in relation to their financial resources and
probable cost of the litigation. 8 The court then conducted a
rough cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the plaintiffs
would be likely to pursue their claims to a final judgment and
seek appellate review of an adverse class determination.' 9 If the
court concluded that the individual claims would not be pursued
because the value of the possible recovery was an insufficient
incentive to proceed, the death knell doctrine regarded denial of
certification as a final decision from which appeal could be
taken.20
The Livesay decision rejected the death knell doctrine. In
Livesay the Court did not question the basic death knell
assumption that denial of certification often ends the litigation
through voluntary dismissal. Nevertheless, the court found that
under death knell doctrine circumstances, a decision denying
certification does not satisfy the requirement of finality for final
judgment rule purposes. According to Livesay, denial of
certification even in death knell cases did not end the litigation
for final judgment rule purposes because the representative
16. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Hooley v. Red Carpet Corp., 549 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1977); Ott v.
Speedwriting Publ'g Co., 518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975); Graci v. United States, 472 F.2d
124 (5th Cir. 1973); Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966).
18. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 471-73.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 469-70.
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plaintiffs were technically still free to proceed on their
individual claims." To the Supreme Court, characterizing an
adverse certification decision that results in abandonment of the
representative plaintiffs' individual claims as an appealable final
order "would run 'directly contrary to the policy of the final
judgment rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the sound
reasons for it."' 2'
The Livesay court was especially concerned that
recognizing the death knell doctrine would be antithetical to the
congressional objective of carefully confining the availability of
interlocutory review.24 That concern was particularly acute
because in the Court's view the death knell doctrine allowed
appeal of nonfinal orders as a matter of right, not discretion as
provided in the general interlocutory appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b).2' Additional factors considered by the Court in
rejecting the death knell doctrine were that the doctrine limited
the appeal right to plaintiffs and interfered with the appropriate
relationship between trial and appellate courts by involving
"appellate courts indiscriminately into the trial process." 26
Although prior to rule 23(f) several exceptions to the final
judgment rule had been recognized both by statute and case law,
none was really a close fit for interlocutory review of
certification decisions. The' Livesay court found that the death
knell doctrine and certification decisions in general failed each
aspect of the three-part test for the collateral order exception,
recognized by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corporation.2 ' First, because under rule 23(c)(1)
a certification order is subject to revision by the district court,
the order does not "conclusively determine the disputedquestion. Second, because certification decisions almost
22. Id. at 467.
23. Id. at 471 (quoting Kom v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1305 (2d Cir. 1971)).
24. Id. at 474-75.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 476.
27. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). From one perspective the collateral final order rule is not an
exception but an instance of application of the final decision rule. In Cohen the Court
found the interlocutory order appealable "because it is a final disposition of a claimed right
which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with
it." Id. at 546-47.
28. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 468-69.
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invariably involve consideration of factual and legal issues that
also go to the merits of the plaintiff's case, they do not "resolve
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action."29 Finally, because the named plaintiff or intervening
class members can raise the correctness of the certification
decision on appeal after final judgment, the order is not
"effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."30
A few certification decisions" have been held appealable
under the final judgment rule exception created by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), the Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Act of
1958.32 However, two provisions of the Act militate against its
effectiveness in general and particularly for appeal of
certification decisions: First, both the district court judge and the
court of appeals are given absolute discretion whether to allow
the appeal; 31 and second, approval of the appeal requires a
determination that the certification order "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion."'' In practice the two provisions have
29. Id
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Lukenas v. Bryce's Mountain Resort, Inc., 538 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1976);
Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977); see also 7B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1802, at n.50 (2d ed. 1986).
32. Section 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay
proceeding in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals
or a judge thereof shall so order.
33. In Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994), the
United States Supreme Court commented on district court and court of appeals discretion
under section 1292(b):
We recognize that § 1292 is not a panacea, both because it depends to a degree
on the indulgence of the court from which review is sought and because the
discretion to decline to hear an appeal is broad ....
ld. at 883 n.9 (citing Livesay, 437 U.S. at 475, and noting parenthetically that serious
docket congestion may be an adequate reason to affirm denial of appeal).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
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proved to significantly limit the" effectiveness of § 1292(b)."
Especially in class action cases section 1292(b) requests to
appeal are likely to receive a reluctant, if not hostile, reception
from the district judge, the court may fail to find the controlling
question of law standard satisfied, and many courts suggest that
the requirement that the appeal "materially advance" the
termination of the litigation means that the order must involve a
critical issue in the case and have a significant impact on the
court's adjudication of the merits. The result is that section
1292(b) has seen limited use in the class action appellate
context.37
Prior to adoption of rule 23(f) another significant route for
interlocutory appellate court consideration of class action
certification decisions was by writ of mandamus, theoretically
not an appeal procedure.38 However, a number of circuit courts
of appeals used mandamus to review certification decisions.39
Those courts found the stringent standards of mandamus
satisfied. The standards are twofold: First, the challenged order
35. See Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PiTr. L. REv. 717, 732-33 (1993); see also Rebecca A.
Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by "Manufacturing" a Final Judgment Through
Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 MERCER L. REV. 979, 994-95 (1997); Amy
Schmidt Jones, Note, The Use of Mandumus to Vacate Mass Exposure Tort Class
Certification Orders, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 232, 235-36 (1997); Kruse, supra note I1, at 717-
18.
36. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, at 478-79.
37. Regarding the frequency of appeals under section 1292(b) generally, one well-
known group of commentators reports:
In the early years of the statute, the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts included statistics on district
court orders certifying § 1292(b) appeals and court of appeals orders granting or
denying permission to appeal. A comprehensive survey of the reports suggested
that application to the courts of appeals for permission were made in few more
than 100 cases a year, and that only about half of the applications were granted.
Although more recent statistics are not available, it is clear that § 1292(b) has
not made serious inroads on the final judgment rule.
16 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3929, at 363
(2d ed. 1996).
38. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, § 1802, at 481-83. But see
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964) (addressing the use of mandamus, the
Court said, "It is, of course, well settled, that the writ is not to be used as a substitute for
appeal... even though hardship may result from delay and perhaps unnecessary trial").
39. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1385 (11th Cir.
1998); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995); In re
Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
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must not be effectively reviewable at the end of the case, that is,
it must inflict irreparable harm.40 Second, "the order must so far
exceed the proper bounds of judicial discretion as to be...
considered usurpative in character, or in violation of a clear and
indisputable legal right, or, at the very least, patently
erroneous." 4' Even the courts of appeals that have employed
mandamus for review of class certification decisions have
recognized that few certification orders will meet those tests,
and perhaps more importantly, have acknowledged the Supreme
Court's warning that mandamus is a drastic remedy to be
employed only in the most extraordinary cases because it
effectively circumvents the final judgment rule. 2
In sum, on the eve of rule 23(f)'s adoption, interlocutory
review of class certification decisions was not possible save (1)
through the rare successful discretionary interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); (2) through the even more narrow
"collateral final order" doctrine; or (3) by stretching, if not
perverting, the mandamus criteria.43 If change was to come, it
would have to be, as suggested by the Supreme Court in
Livesay, through legislative or rule revision rather than judicial
decision.
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR ALLOWING APPEAL OF INTERLOCUTORY
CERTIFICATION DECISIONS BUT NOT
OTHER INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS
To create a discreet interlocutory appeal procedure for class
certification decisions, the Advisory and Standing Committees
had to distinguish certification decisions from a number of other
significant interlocutory decisions, such as denials of summary
judgment and new trial motions. The latter interlocutory
decisions are generally not appealable but can have an impact on
40. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1295.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1305-06 (Rovner, J. dissenting); see also In re Catawba Indian Tribe, 973
F.2d 1133, 1137 (4th Cir. 1992); DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1982).
43. Professors Wright, Miller. and Kane discuss three additional interlocutory appeal
procedures possibly available for appeal of certification decisions. WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 31, at 474-77, 483-84. However, those procedures either apply in limited
circumstances (for instance, in connection with appeals of preliminary injunctions under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)) or have not been successful. Id.
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the course of litigation at least equivalent to that of the
certification decision. A number of courts, commentators, and
members of the two committees viewed class certification
decisions as no more worthy of an exception to the final
judgment rule than those other interlocutory decisions." Their
overriding concern was that allowing interlocutory appeal of
certification decisions would seriously undermine the underlying
values of the final judgment rule.4 ' A catalogue of other
arguments against recognition of a broad interlocutory appeal
mechanism for certification decisions included a number of
undesirable outcomes:
1. The interlocutory appeal may result in inappropriate
intrusion into the proper domain of the trial judge. In the words
of the Second Circuit, "The line between helpful guidance and
noxious interference is a narrow one, and one goal of the final
judgment rule is that of maintaining the appropriate relationship
between the respective courts"; 46
2. Trial judges are frequently confronted with interlocutory
decisions, which, if found erroneous on appeal, may result in
unnecessary and time-consuming consequences;
3. Because certification decisions are reviewed on an abuse
of discretion basis, the latitude of that standard would provide
significant appellate guidance only in appeals of the most
egregiously erroneous decisions;
41
4. Because the class action determination is to be made "as
soon as practicable" following commencement of the class
action litigation, the certification decision may come before the
case has been sufficiently developed to provide an adequate
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0 committee note: "The Federal Judicial Center Study
supports the view that many suits with class-action allegations present familiar and almost
routine issues that are no more worthy of immediate appeal than many other interlocutory
rulings"; see also Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Minutes of February 16-17, 1995. 1995 WL 870909, at *13 (comments of Judge
William W. Schwarzer); Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, Minutes of June 19, 1996, 1996 WL 936792, at *21 (comments of Sol
Schreiber).
45. Parkinson v. April Indus., 520 F.2d 650, 652-55 (2d Cir. 1975); see also id. at 658-
60 (Friendly, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 654.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 655.
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appellate record for review of 'all factors appropriate to the
decision;"
5. Other avenues of review exist for the relatively few
certification decisions for which supervisory appellate guidance
is warranted. The other avenues of review include the collateral
order doctrine, mandamus, and discretionary interlocutory
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b);-4
6. Because by the terms of rule 23(c)(1) a class certification
order "may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits," post-certification order discovery or other
developments could require revision of the original order,
presenting the specter of possible successive interlocutory
appeals of the certification order;" and
7. Interlocutory appellate intervention should be limited to
large, complex class actions. Only in those cases are defendants
likely to incur the substantial litigation expenses and run the risk
of a large judgment if found liable that justify an exception to
the final judgment rule. 2
Although those arguments presented a substantial case for
viewing the need for interlocutory review of certification
decisions as being no greater than that for many other
interlocutory decisions, the Advisory and Standing Committees
thought a distinction was justified, for several reasons:
1. The certification decision involves issues fundamental to
the further conduct of the case that should be resolved early in
the litigation;53
2. A defendant who expends substantial amounts of time
and money defending a class action later reversed on appeal
from a final judgment on a determination that the certification
decision was in error is harmed irreparably;m
49. Id.
50. Id.
5 1. Id. at 653.
52. Id. at 654 n.2.
53. Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (2d Cir. 1974);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417
U.S. 156 (1974); Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Minutes of June 19-20, 1997, 1997 WL 1056244, at * 14.
54. Herbst, 495 F.2d at 1312; Eisen, 479 F.2d at 1007 n.1; see also In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995).
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3. Supervising a class action after a certification decision is
likely to be significantly more demanding of a district court's
resources than following other interlocutory decisions;"
4. Appellate courts are more reluctant to hold certification
improper after the district court and the parties have expended
substantial resources in the conduct of the proceedings following
the certification decision. Deferring review until after entry of
final judgment may in some cases thwart any effective review of
the class action designation;
5 6
5. Judicial efficiency dictates appellate review of the
certification decision before the district court and the parties
have expended the extensive resources normally associated with
class action preparation and trial;
57
6. Interlocutory review would lessen the in terrorem effect
of certification decisions that force class action plaintiffs to
abandon valid but financially unworthy claims and pressure
defendants into settling with diminished regard for their
potential liability on the merits; 58
55. Herbst, 495 F.2d at 1313; see also Parkinson, 520 F.2d at 654.
56. Parkinson, 520 F.2d at 653; Herbst, 495 F.2d at 1313.
57. Parkinson, 520 F.2d at 654; Herbst, 495 F.2d at 1313.
58. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules;
Minutes of February 16-17, 1995, 1995 WL 870909, at *18. The committee note to rule
23(f) explains:
[Sleveral concerns justify expansion of present opportunities to appeal. An order
denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in which the
only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment on the
merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of
litigation. An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run
the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be met at low cost by
establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant interlocutory
review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues.
See also the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1299, which
spoke of concern with forcing the defendants in that case "to stake their companies on the
outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if
they have no legal liability"; and the Second Circuit's assessment in Parkinson that:
Admittedly the impact of large plaintiff class actions upon defendants is great.
The expense of defense increases with the introduction of the enlarged class,
with the broadening of the substantive issues, and with the preliminary pretrial
skirmishing. Of perhaps greater importance in realistic terms is the increase in
potential liability which could force the defendant to settle plaintiffs' claims
regardless of the merits of the plaintiffs' cases.
Parkinson, 520 F.2d at 654.
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7. Because class action defendants often settle rather than
risk the prospect of an overwhelming judgment to the class, and
because plaintiffs frequently dismiss following an adverse
certification decision, the propriety of the certification decision
in those cases is not subject to appellate review; 9
8. Sound judicial administration is promoted through
immediate review of class designation orders by lessening the
burdens imposed on district judges and enhancing the proper
role of the circuit courts in 0iving guidance through
development of class action doctrine; and
9. Development of standards is more feasible for class
action certification decisions than for other less focused
interlocutory decisions. 6
Likely no single argument was decisive with the committee
members for drawing a distinction that allows appeal of
interlocutory certification decisions but not other interlocutory
decisions. However, the cumulative effect of the arguments
proved persuasive to the Advisory and Standing Committees.
62
V. THE OPERATION OF RULE 23(f)
From the early stages of its active consideration of the
interlocutory appeal procedure for class actions, the Advisory
Committee focused on creating a rule that would accommodate
the need for appellate review of class certification decisions in
59. Herbst, 495 F.2d at 1313.
60. Parkinson, 520 F.2d at 654.
61. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rtiles of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes of June 19-20, .1997, 1997 WL 1056244, at *13. The Advisory
Committee speculated that
the new interlocutory appeal provision could reap significant benefits, and [will
be] easy to implement. Appellate courts have strained to take a more active role
in class-action law in recent years, with good results. Affording a more regular
means of involvement, increasing the opportunities for appellate review, may do
much to simplify current law and make practice more nearly uniform.
Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of
May 1-2, 1997, 1997 WL 1056241, at *6; see also General Motors Corp. v. City of New
York, 501 F.2d 639, 659-60 (2d Cir. 1974); Parkinson, 520 F.2d at 654.
62. The rule 23(f) proposal was approved by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at
its May I and 2, 1997 meeting, 1997 WL 1056241, at *6, and by the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure at its June 19 and 20 meeting, 1997 WL 1056244, at
*3.
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appropriate cases while not, substantially undermining the
general policies of the final judgment rule.63 Working from 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), the general interlocutory appeal statute, "in an
effort to invoke familiar concepts that will ease application of a
new rule,""6 the Committee nevertheless sought to avoid that
statute's perceived limitations. Two provisions of the statute
were identified as primary deficiencies: (1) placing the initial
decision to allow the appeal in the absolute discretion of the
district court judge; and (2) requiring that the appeal satisfy the
"controlling question of law" standard.6 The way rule 23(f)
addresses those deficiencies and other issues related to the
operation of the rule in practice will be considered below.
A. Allowing the Appeal: Who Decides?
Rule 23(f) shifts the decision whether to allow the appeal
from the district court to the court of appeals. The prevailing
view within the Advisory Committee was that removing the
power of the district judge to defeat any opportunity to appeal
was significant." The change was thought to be significant for
the obvious reason that a grant or denial of certification can
determine the outcome of the litigation and for the perception
that the need for review may be greatest in situations that are
least likely to receive approval to appeal from the district court.67
According to comments in the committee minutes, eliminating
the formal role of the district court in the appellate process was
intended to make appeals more readily available. s In addition,
because the opportunity for appellate guidance during the early
years of any new class action provision was thought to be
invaluable, the greater flexibility in the appellate process that
63. See, e.g, Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Minutes of February 16-17, 1995, 1995 WL 870909, at *17 (comments of Robert C.
Heim). Mr. Heim stated, "Draft Rule 23(f) strikes the right balance on appeal rights. The
opportunity to appeal grant or denial of class certification may impede pressure for
settlement, but that is a good thing." Id.
64. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
Minutes of November 9-10, 1995, 1995 WL 870908, at *3.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *4.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *3.
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would come as a result of .bypassing the district court was
believed important for future substantial changes to rule 23.69
Concern was also expressed that appeals might be
inappropriately denied by a judge determined to effect
settlement following a grant of class certification calculated to
encourage settlement or by a judge with a dislike for the
plaintiffs underlying claim. 0 However, a number of substantial
arguments were advanced within the Committee for retaining
the district court as gatekeeper of the appellate process:
1. District court judges who have reached a reasonably firm
decision as to certification will welcome appellate review,
particularly in cases presenting uncertain questions of law;7'
2. There is little reason to fear that district court
intransigence will thwart necessary appeals;"
3. If. the district court judge has no voice in the appeal
decision, the judge may defer certification decisions;73
4. District court involvement is particularly important in
cases that have generated lengthy records;74 and
5. The district court's greater familiarity with the record
will-support a better evaluation of the value of the appeal.75
Although the arguments in favor of retaining direct district
court participation in the appeal decision did not carry the day,
the desirability of district court involvement received some
recognition in the committee note to the rule. After first
acknowledging that the rule departs from the section 1292(b)
model by removing the district court from formal participation
in the appeal decision,76 the note suggests an informal role for
the district court:
[T]he district court often can assist the parties and court of
appeals by offering advice on the desirability of appeal ....
The district court, having worked through the certification
decision, often will be able to provide cogent advice on the
69. Id.






76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) committee note.
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factors that bear on the decision whether to permit appeal.
This advice can be particularly valuable if the certification
decision is tentative. Even as to a firm certification
decision, a statement of reasons bearing on the probable
benefits and costs of immediate appeal can help focus the
court of appeals' decision, and may persuade the
disappointed party that an attempt to appeal would be
fruitless."
The suggestion by way of a committee note that a court act
informally without specific direction from the rule itself is
unusual, if not unique. Having made the suggestion, the note
offers no guidance to the district court as to the mechanism by
which it is to make its voice heard. Is the advice to be. included
as part of the certification order or by .separate order or
memorandum? May or must the parties and court of appeals
request the advice? If so, how? Is the advice to be given
routinely as part of every certification decision? Because the
note speaks of the district court's advice assisting the court of
appeals in its decision, communication of that advice to the
court of appeals by some mechanism is obviously contemplated.
B. Allowing the Appeal: What is the Standard?
In addition to departing from the 1292(b) model by
excluding the district judge from the formal appeal process, the
language of rule 23(f) does not include the "controlling question
of law" standard for acting on the appeal request or, for that
matter, any standard at all. As a result, allowance of the appeal
is at the "sole discretion of the court of appeals."7" Although
neither the committee minutes nor the committee note offer
much illumination as to the reason for the omission, the note and
minutes do refer to the "controlling question of law" provision
as a "limiting requirement" and comment that the rule aims at
"expansion of present opportunities to appeal," presumably by
omitting the limiting language.79
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Minutes of November 9-10, 1995, 1995 WL 870908, at *3.
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There was some apprehension within -the Advisory
Committee that lack of a stated standard for allowing appeals
would result in too many appeals, and that appeals would be
attempted in the overwhelming majority of cases. 0 The response
was that experience indicated appeals of certification decisions
are most likely in more complex and contentious class actions.'
Apparently the Committee considered certification decision
appeals not as likely in the more typical class action. The view
was also expressed that most certification decisions depend on
specific case circumstances for which the circuit court of
appeals would be unlikely to grant the appeal, and that most
cases for which appeal will be granted will involve unsettled
questions of law.82
In contrast to the discussion in the Advisory Committee,
the debate in the Standing Committee did not directly address
the "too many appeals" concern. Apparently basing their
response on experience under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the appellate
judge members of the Standing Committee simply predicted that
even if rule 23(f) generates more appeals than expected, the
courts of appeals will make prompt decisions both as to
accepting rule 23(f) appeals and in regard to the merits of
appeals accepted."
The committee note attempts to clarify the standard for
acting on appeals by emphasizing the absolute nature of the
discretion to be exercised by the court of appeals:
The court of appeals is given unfettered discretion whether
to permit the appeal, akin to the discretion exercised by the
Supreme Court in acting on a petition for certiorari. This
discretion suggests an analogy to the provision in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) for permissive appeal on certification by a
district court.
84
If the court of appeals' discretion is to be "unfettered" and
similar to that exercised by the Supreme Court in certiorari
80. Id. at *5.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes of June 19.20, 1997, 1997 WL 1056244, at *14.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) committee note.
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decisions, 5 the rule contemplates that appeals will infrequently
be allowed. 6 The original committee note had been drafted to
reflect that sentiment: Permission to appeal "almost always will
be denied when the certification decision turns on case-specific
matter of fact and district court discretion."87 Following
publication of the proposed note, the negative "almost always
85. Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes the
considerations governing the Court's review of decisions on writ of certiorari. Although
much of the rule addresses concerns peculiar to the Supreme Court's review of federal and
state decisions, review of the rule is useful for developing a sense of the discretion
contemplated by the committee note to rule 23(0:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.
The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of
this Court's supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of
a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law.
Sup. CT. R. 10.
86. For comparison, the United States Supreme Court grants approximately one percent
of applications for certiorari. At the opposite end of the spectrum from the arguments for
allowing certification decision appeals only at the discretion of the court of appeals was the
position that all certification decisions should be subject to an absolute right of appeal. The
discretionary appeal was thought to be illusory because the draft of rule 23(f) offered no
assurance that appeals would be granted. The frequent failure of courts of appeals to grant
interlocutory appeals under section 1292(b) was cited in support. The response was that a
right to appeal could lead to abuse. A Federal Judicial Center study determined that many
certification decisions are "routine" and without appealable issues. However, a right to
appeal would serve as a strong temptation, particularly to defendants, to appeal
certification decisions whenever possible. A right to appeal could also encourage contests
of certification decisions rather than agreement to certification through stipulation. See
Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of
November 9-10, 1995, 1995 WL 870908, at *4.
87. 12A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, app.
C, at 300 (2d ed. 1999).
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will be denied" languag6 *was transformed into the more
positive-sounding:
Permission to :appeal may be granted or denied on the basis
of. any consideration that the court of appeals finds
persuasive. Permission is most likely to be granted when
the certification decision turns on a novel or unsettled
question of law, or when, as a practical matter, the decision
on certification is likely dispositive of the litigation.8
In Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc.,89 the first decision
in a rule 23(f) appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
struggled to develop more specific standards for accepting
appeals under the rule. After considering the ambiguous
suggestions of the committee note, the court eschewed
"inventing standards" and focused instead on "the reasons rule
23(f) came into being." 9 This approach cabins acceptable rule
23(f) appeals into the three categories of class action cases that
the court perceives the rule was designed to address: (1) death
knell type cases in which an adverse certification decision would
cause the representative plaintiffs to dismiss their individual
claims because continuance of the litigation would not. be
financially worthwhile; 9' (2) forced settlement type cases where
class certification pressures the defendant to settle with
diminished regard for liability on the merits; 92 and (3) cases that
will further the development of class action law. 93 The Blair
decision and the Seventh Circuit's approach to the standards for
granting permission to appeal are considered further in Part V.
Closely related to the concern that rule 23(f) appeals will
overwhelm the courts of appeals is the fear that the new
interlocutory appeal procedure will delay and disrupt the
processing of class actions.9' The committee note responds to
that concern by citing the relatively short timeframe for making
application to appeal: within ten days of the certification order.95
88. FED. R. Civ.'P. 23(f) committee note.
89. 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
90. Id. at 834.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 835.
94. Id.
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) committee note.
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The ten-day limit is "designed toreduce-the risk that attempted
appeals will disrupt continuing proceedings." 96 The note also
expresses the "expectation" that "the courts of appeals will act
quickly in making the preliminary determination whether to
permit the appeal." 97
C. Appellate Procedures
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
"Appeals by Permission," addresses the procedures to be
followed in the court of appeals for a rule 23(f) appeal.9 Rule 5
96. Id.
97. Id. The "expectation," of course, is nothing more than an expression of hope, for
there is no formal mechanism that will compel early decisions. A statement in the advisory
committee minutes is even more specific, expressing the likelihood that the courts of
appeals will generally act within 30 days in making the decision whether to allow the
appeal. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
Minutes of November 9-10, 1995, 1995 WL 870908, at *4. In addition, many members of
the Committee, including the Committee's appellate judges, cited experience with
discretionary interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b):
[T]he courts of appeals make prompt decisions--usually within a matter of
days-on whether to accept an interlocutory appeal. And once they accept an
interlocutory appeal, they normally decide it on the merits with dispatch. Several
members emphasized that the courts of appeals.simply will not take cases that do
not appear to have merit. Some judges added that class action decisions were an
important area of jurisprudence that could be helped by having more appellate
decisions, especially at early stages of litigation before the parties incur great
costs and delays.
Minutes, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 1997.WL 1056244, at *14
(Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, June 19-20, 1997).
98. The text of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 follows:
RULE 5. APPEAL BY PERMISSION
(a) Petition for Permission to Appeal.
(I) To request permission to appeal when an appeal is within the court
of appeals' discretion, a party must file a petition for permission to
appeal. The petition must be filed with the circuit clerk with proof of
service on all other parties to the district-court action.
(2) The petition must be filed within the time specified by the statute
or rule authorizing the appeal or, if no such time is specified, within
the time provided by Rule 4(a) for filing a notice of appeal.
(3) If a party cannot petition for appeal unless the district court first
enters an order granting permission to do so or stating that the
necessary conditions are met, the district court may amend its order,
either on its own or in response to a party's motion, to include the
required permission or statement. In that event, the time to petition
runs from entry of the amended order.
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was also revised effective December 1, 1998, partly in
anticipation of the adoption of rule 23(f)." Under rule 5 the
appeal process is initiated by filing a "petition for permission to
appeal." As with the time period for filing the petition to appeal,
the time set by rule 5 for responding to the petition is relatively
short: seven days after the petition for permission to appeal is
served.'°° The petition and response are to be submitted without
oral argument unless the court of appeals orders otherwise. '" '
(b) Contents of the Petition; Answer or Cross-Petition; Oral Argument.
(I) The petition must include the following:
(A) the facts necessary to understand the question presented;
(B) the question itself;
(C) the relief sought;
(D) the reasons why the appeal should be allowed and is
authorized by a statute or rule; and
(E) an attached copy of:
(i) the order, decree, or judgment complained of and any related
opinion or memorandum, and
(ii) any order stating the district court's permission to appeal or
finding that the necessary conditions are met.
(2) A party may file an answer in opposition or a cross-petition within
7 days after the petition is served.
(3) The petition and answer will be submitted without oral argument
unless the court of appeals orders otherwise.
(c) Form of Papers; Number of Copies. All papers must conform to Rule
32(a)(1). An original and 3 copies must be filed unless the court requires a
different number by local rule or by order in a particular case.
(d) Grant of Permission; Fees; Cost Bond; Filing the Record.
(I) Within 10 days after the entry of the order granting permission to
appeal, the appellant must:
(A) pay the district clerk all required fees; and
(B) file a cost bond if required under Rule 7.
(2) A notice of appeal need not be filed. The date when the order
granting permission to appeal is entered serves as the date of the
notice of appeal for calculating time under these rules.
(3) The district clerk must notify the circuit clerk once the petitioner
has paid the fees. Upon receiving this notice, the circuit clerk must
enter the appeal on the docket. The record must be forwarded and
filed in accordance with Rules I I and 12(c).
99. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
Minutes of April 15, 1996, 1996 WL 936781, at *10-*11. The primary purpose in revising
rule 5 was to expand its scope to govern all interlocutory appeals in the federal court
system, both existing and future. Id.
100. FED. R. APP. P. 5. Although there was some support within the Appellate Rules
Advisory Committee for ten-day or fourteen-day periods, the seven-day response period
prevailed. One cited reason supporting the shorter period was that because the petition
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Several more technical aspects of the rule 5 procedures are
worth noting. Under rule 5, the petition for permission to appeal
is filed with the circuit clerk, rather than with the district clerk. 102
The rule does not require the filing of a notice of appeal.' 3 The
date of the order granting permission to appeal is substituted for
the notice of appeal for purposes of calculating time under the
appellate rules.' The fees for the appeal are to be paid to the
district clerk, however, and any bond required must be filed with
the district clerk, not the circuit clerk.'05
Neither the application for permission to appeal nor the
allowance of the appeal automatically stays any proceedings,
including discovery, in the district court. However, both the
district court and the court of appeals may grant stay orders.' 07
The committee note indicates that the stay order should be
sought first from the district court.' 8 Moreover, the note
contemplates court of appeals deference to district court
decisions denying requests for stays, stating that the trial court's
"action and any explanation of its views should weigh heavily
with the court of appeals." "'p In the Blair case, discussed below,
the Seventh Circuit also addressed the question of the standard
for staying proceedings during pendency of requests for appeal.
itself must be filed within ten days after entry of the order, it would be anomalous to
require a longer response period. Minutes, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, 1996
WL 936781, at *10-*l I (Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, April
15, 1996).
101. FED. R. App. P. 5.
102. Id.; cf FED. R. APP. P. 4, which requires filing of the notice of appeal with the
district clerk.
103. See FED. R. APP. P. 5.
104. Id.
105. Id. The fees are to be paid and the bond filed within ten days after entry of the order
granting permission to appeal. Id.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0; see also Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of November 9-10, 1995, 1995 WL 870908, at *4.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) committee note.
109. Id.
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VI. THE FIRST COURT.OF APPEALS DECISION OF A RULE 23(f)
APPLICATION TO APPEAL: BLAIR V. EQUIFAX
CHECK SERVICES, INC. 0
The first ruling on a request for permission to appeal under
rule 23(f) was made in Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc."'
The parties were directed to file briefs discussing the standard to
be employed in deciding whether to grant appeals under the rule,
apparently because, as the court noted, the application to appeal
in Blair was the first in the nation to be considered."2 The result
is an opinion quite obviously crafted to serve as a guide for other
rule 23(f) appeal requests.
Undertaking the task of developing standards for acting on
rule 23(f) requests for permission to appeal, the Blair court
began by citing the language of the committee note that
"[p]ermission to appeal may be granted or denied on the basis of
any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive" and
that the discretion to be exercised by the court of appeals is
"akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting
on a petition for certiorari."" 3 The opinion then sets the
analytical platform from which to develop the rule 23(f)
standards:
Although rule 10 of the Supreme Court's Rules identifies
some of the considerations that inform the grant of
certiorari, they are "neither controlling nor fully measuring
the Court's discretion." Likewise it would be a mistake for
us to draw up a list that determines how the power under
rule 23(f) will be exercised. Neither a bright-line approach
nor a catalog of factors would serve well-especially at the
outset, when courts necessarily must experiment with the
new class of appeals.' 14
After discounting both the guidelines from the Supreme
Court's certiorari standards and the need to develop specific
23(f) standards, the court looked for guidance from "the reasons
110. 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
111. Id. at 833.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id..at 833-34 (quoting the introductory paragraph to SUP. CT. R. 10).
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rule 23(f) came into being."" 5 Three were found: (1) to provide
interlocutory review of certification decisions in death knell type
cases;" (2) to review certification decisions that impose
substantial pressure on the defendant to settle on a basis not
reflective of the merits of the plaintiffs' claim; 1 7 and (3) to
facilitate the development of legal doctrine in class action
litigation."8
In considering interlocutory appeals of certification
decisions in death knell type cases where the representative
plaintiffs' claim is too small to justify the expense of continuing
the litigation to a final appealable judgment, Judge Easterbrook,
author of the Blair opinion, cautioned that "we must be wary
lest the mind hear a bell that is not tolling." "9 By that he meant
that rule 23(f) should not be invoked for class actions that may
superficially appear to involve death knell. situations but will
actually be litigated to a final judgment because the litigation is
financed by the representative plaintiffs' law firm or other
interests 20 The court found justification for death knell type
appeals only "when denial of class status seems likely to be
fatal, and when the plaintiff has a solid argument in opposition
to the district court's decision."' 2'
Under the Seventh Circuit's standards, interlocutory
appeals are allowed in the second category of class actions,
115. Id. at 834.
116. Id.
117. Id. As the court explained,
Many corporate executives are unwilling to bet their company that they are in
the right in big-stakes litigation, and a grant of class status can propel the stakes
of a case into the stratosphere. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293
(7th Cir. 1995), observes not only that class actions can have this effect on
risk-averse corporate executives (and corporate counsel) but also that some
plaintiffs or even some district judges may be tempted to use the class device to
wring settlements from defendants whose legal positions are justified but
unpopular. Empirical studies of securities class actions imply that this is
common. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991); Reinier Kraakman,
Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder
Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733 (1994); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991).
Id.
118. Id. at 835.
119. Id. at 834.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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those in which a defendant may be forced into non-merits based
settlement as a result of the decision to certify, "when the stakes
are large and the risk of a settlement or other disposition that
does not reflect the merits of the claim is substantial.'22 A
secondary justification offered by the court for allowing appeals
in this category is that class certification decisions have induced
some judges to alter substantive doctrine to make the litigation
more manageable.2 3 The particular concern here was apparently
with the impact of class action litigation on the development of
federal securities law.1
24
The third ground for allowing rule 23(f) appeals under the
Blair criteria is facilitating the development of class action
doctrine. As Judge Easterbrook noted, "Because a large
proportion of class actions settles or is resolved in a way that
overtakes procedural matters, some fundamental issues about
class actions are poorly developed." 123 Although the court noted
that if the district court's certification decision is clearly sound,
interlocutory appeals should generally not be allowed in death
knell and forced settlement type cases, it concluded that
demonstrating foundational infirmity of the lower court decision
is less important when the appeal is likely to contribute to class
action doctrinal development.
After announcing the standards to be applied generally to
requests for rule 23(f) review, the Seventh Circuit's decision
whether to allow the appeal itself was almost anticlimactic. The
class action issue at stake on the merits of the appeal was
whether a settlement in one Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
class action'27 brought against defendant Equifax bound class
122. Id. at 835.
123. Id. at 834 (citing Hal S. Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 337 (1971)). According to the court, "[tihis interaction of procedure with the
merits justifies an earlier appellate look. By the end of the case it will be too late-if
indeed the case has an ending that is subject to appellate review." Id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 835 ("Recent proposals to amend Rule 23 were designed in part to clear up
some of these questions. Instead, the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee
elected to wait, anticipating that appeals under Rule 23(f) would resolve some questions
and illuminate others.").
126. Id. ("But the more fundamental the question and the' greater the likelihood that it
will escape effective disposition at the end of the case, the more appropriate is an appeal
under Rule 23(f). More than this it is impossible to say.").
127. Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., No 97-4240, 1998 WL 704050 (N.D. Ill.
FEDERAL RULE OF CML PROCEDURE 23(o
members in a second class action also against Equifax on the
same grounds,'28 both filed in the Northern District of Illinois.
Equifax argued that the Blair class members were also members
of the Crawford action and thus bound by the terms of the
settlement.'29 Among the terms of the Crawford settlement was a
prohibition against any class member prosecuting any other case
against Equifax as a class action. 3 The court allowed the
appeal, finding that the case fell within the last of its three
categories of appropriate interlocutory appeals, that the appeal
raised a significant issue of class action law. 3' The court also
noted that the issue of the relation among multiple class actions
was unsettled and might not otherwise be subject to appellate
review.'-"
Having decided to accept the appeal, the Seventh Circuit
proceeded in the same opinion to consider the merits of the
appeal. The court found that because the Crawford class action
had not reached final judgment, the trial court judge in Blair did
not abuse his discretion by certifying the case as a class action. 3'
The Blair court also dealt with two other issues that,
although secondary in importance to the issue of the standards
applicable to rule 23(f) requests to appeal, are nevertheless of
Sept. 30, 1998).
128. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., No. 97 C 8913, 1999 WL 116225 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 26, 1999).
129. Blair, 181 F.3d at 836.
130. Id. Judge Easterbrook wrote critically of the settlement:
A peculiar settlement it is. Equifax agreed to change the letters it sends in the
future. Crawford personally receives $2,000. Members of the Crawford class get
no relief for the letters sent to them, though Equifax agreed to donate $5,500 to
Northwestern Law School's Legal Aid Clinic and (natch) the lawyers for the
class receive fees for their work. According to the settlement, none of the class
members will receive individual notice, and none will be offered the opportunity
to opt out. The theory behind this is that the class was certified under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2), even though it began as an action seeking damages. Finally, the
settlement provides that all class members' claims for compensatory or statutory
damages pass through the litigation unaffected and may be asserted elsewhere-
but only in individual suits. The settlement forbids prosecution of any other case
as a class action. It is this final feature of the Crawford settlement that Equifax
contends should have led Judge Plunkett to decertify the Blair-Wilbon class.
Maintaining Blair as a class action creates at least a possibility of inconsistent
outcomes.
Id.
131. Id. at 837-38.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 838.
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significance to the development of rule 23(f) doctrine. The first
of these issues concerns-the circumstances under which district
court proceedings should be stayed pending the interlocutory
appeal. Rule 23(f) begs the question by directing that "[a]n
appeal... not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the court of appeals so orders." 134
Addressing the standard for granting stays pending appeal,
Judge Easterbrook noted that appeals under the general
interlocutory, appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), have been
infrequent in part because of a judicial perception that "[section
1292(b)] procedure interrupts the progress of a case and
prolongs its disposition. "'3  Although the no-automatic-stay
provision is found in both rule 23(f) and section 1292(b), Judge
Easterbrook concluded that rule 23(f), as distinguished from
§ 1292(b), is draft.ed to avoid delay. 36 In support of, that
conclusion, he, cited the no-automatic-stay language of rule
23(f).' 37
The Seventh Circuit's standard in Blair for granting a stay
turns on whether "the probability of error in the class
certification decision is high enough that the costs of pressing
ahead in the district court exceed the costs' of waiting.'
According to Judge Easterbrook, stays under this standard "will
be infrequent' and, as a result; "interlocutory appeals under
Rule 23(f) should not unduly retard the pace of litigation:".'39
The other secondary issue considered in Blair was the
effect of a motion for reconsideration on the ten-day period for
making a rule 23(f) application to appeal. The language of the
rule requires filing the application to appeal to the court of
appeals "within ten days after entry of the order." 140 The
position of the, plaintiffs in Blair was that the "order" referred to
in the rule was. limited by the language of the rule itself to the
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(0.
135. Blair, 181 F.3d at 835.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Judge Easterbrook notes that "[t]his is the same kind of question that a court
asks when deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction or a stay of an administrative
decision." ld.
139. Id
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0,
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"order granting or denying class certification under this rule." 141
The court's response was that under accepted practice federal
courts have long held that a motion for reconsideration tolls the
time for appeal if the motion is made within the time for
appeal.'4 2 The underlying purpose for the practice is to allow
district courts the opportunity promptly to correct their own
alleged errors.' 43 As a result, the Seventh Circuit held that a
motion for reconsideration filed within ten days of a certification
order defers the time for appeal until after the district judge has
disposed of the motion.'"
VII. WILL RULE 23(f) ACHIEVE ITS GOALS?
The good news for interlocutory appeal of class
certification decisions resulting from adoption of rule 23(f) is
that possible district court intransigence and the limiting
controlling question of law standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
have been replaced by the "unfettered discretion"- of the courts
of appeals whether to allow the appeals. At least potentially, the
bad news inheres in the same absolute discretion given the
courts of appeals.
By exercising prompt but careful judgment as to appeals
allowed and by deciding with dispatch the merits of the
certification issues appealed, the courts of .appeals may
demonstrate that the Advisory Committee's assessment that rule
23(f) "might well prove to be the most effective solution to
many of the problems with class actions" was prescient.' 5 The
rule may realize its objectives of: (a) providing a mechanism for
needed appellate review of both death knell and forced
settlement class certification orders; (b) affording a more regular
means of appellate involvement in the class certification
141. Blair, 181 F.3d at 837.
142. Id. (citing United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 (1976); United States v. Healy, 376
U.S. 75 (1964); In re X-Cel, Inc., 823 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1987)). As the court explained,
"The practice is independent of Rule 4(a)(4), or any other rule." Id
143. Id. (quoting United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976)).
144. Id.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
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process; and (c) enabling the courts of appeals to develop
certification standards.1
46
The same absolute discretion that may free the courts of
appeals from the limitations associated with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
carries the potential for abuse of the authority granted by the
rule and, in particular, for significant erosion of the values of the
final judgment rule. The line between helpful guidance and
noxious interference by an appellate court in the proper sphere
of the trial court is indeed a narrow one.141
Because the courts of appeals' discretion under rule 23(f) is
absolute and without guidelines, only experience over time will
tell whether the rule will achieve its laudable goals on the one
hand, carve out an unbounded exception to the final judgment
rule on the other, or simply become another seldom-used,
ineffectual relic of the appellate process not unlike its
interlocutory appeal procedure model, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The
Seventh Circuit's attempt in Blair to set the standard-by setting
no standards but instead focusing on the underlying purposes of
rule 23(f) to provide relief in death knell and forced settlement
type cases and developing certification decision standards-is at
once promising and cause for concern. The decision properly
identifies the appropriate focus of appellate court concern under
rule 23(f). However, it offers little guidance for separating the
wheat of death knell and forced settlement cases from the chaff,
or for identifying "fundamental issues about class actions" that
call for further development.'48 In the Seventh Circuit's view
"neither a bright-line approach nor a catalog of factors would
serve well--especially at the outset, when courts necessarily
must experiment with the new class of appeals."' 14 9 That
approach may initially be sufficient, but if rule 23(f) is to realize
146. See supra text accompanying note 5 and notes 91-94.
147. See supra text accompanying note 47.
148. The only standard offered by the Seventh Circuit for granting appeal of death knell
type cases would apply "when denial of class status seems likely to be fatal, and when the
plaintiff has a solid argument in opposition to the district court's decision." Blair, 181 F.3d
at 834. For allowing appeals of forced settlement type cases, the Seventh Circuit's
guidance is that " when the stakes are large and the risk of a settlement or other disposition
that does not reflect the merits of the claim is substantial, an appeal under rule 23(f) is in
order." Id. at 835. The court suggests that for appeals that "may facilitate the development
of the law," appeal of "fundamental issues about class actions" should be allowed. Id
149. Id. at 834.
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its promise, future courts of appeals' decisions must articulate
more specific appellate guidelines.

